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Since Milton Friedman’s controversial 1970 New York Times article on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), there has been a substantial debate on both the role and nature of 
CSR in business.  Friedman states that since managers are employed by shareholders as a 
result of the separation of ownership and control, the goal of the manager is thus set by 
shareholders and in most instances this will be to maximize the return on shareholders’ 
investment.  Consequently, managers are only obliged to reasonably take account of any 
negative externalities that result from corporate activity as stipulated by legal convention 
and social norms.  As such, any action above this minimum simply reduces shareholder 
wealth.  Moreover, where managers’ act in a socially responsible manner, this will in 
most instances go against the wishes of shareholders as managers are more often than not, 
contractually bound to increase profits and not to undertake socially responsible 
activities. 
This view of CSR and the corporation is not unique to Friedman.  Rappaport (1986) and 
Jensen (2001) argue that the role of managers is to pursue shareholder wealth 
maximization, and thus CSR is simply an additional and unnecessary cost.  Tirole (2001) 
meanwhile states that managerial contracts would be difficult to enforce if social 
responsibility performance metrics formed an explicit part of a corporate manager’s terms 
of employment as CSR performance is difficult to accurately measure.  Profit 
maximization and share price increases however are observable and so managers can be 
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held to account for their actions, as contracts that stipulate performance metrics around 
these two criteria are enforceable. 
Stakeholder theory, however, takes a very different perspective on the role of the 
corporation, and the corporate manager.  Donaldson and Preston (1995) in their analysis 
of stakeholder theory state that despite having three main attributes, it is crucially 
underpinned by its normative base.  In this setting there is intrinsic value in the different 
stakeholder relationships of the firm.  By undertaking CSR activities, managers can 
therefore enhance the value of stakeholder relationships without disadvantaging 
shareholders and increase the value of the corporation.   
Under the free-market view professed by Friedman and others, the market is arguably the 
final arbiter on whether a particular initiative is good or bad for the corporation.  
Although numerous studies analyze the long-term stock market and financial 
performance of firms that are classified as socially responsible under various 
benchmarks, this is not a true test of how the market perceives CSR
2
.  Moreover, the 
long-term stock performance of firms that are classified as socially responsible may be in 
part a function of demand for such stocks by sub-groups of investors (e.g. fund managers 
that screen their investments based on socially responsible criteria).  To capture the 
market’s perception of the value or otherwise of CSR an event that provides an external, 
market based classification of a firm as socially responsible is required.  We therefore use 
the announcement of a firm’s inclusion in the FTSE4Good index as this arguably 
provides new information to the market about a firm’s CSR activities
3
.  Consequently, we 
can analyze whether or not the market views CSR as value enhancing
4
.   
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As a result of the conflicting predictions between the Friedman (1970) rational free 
market view of CSR, that it is simply an excess cost imposed upon shareholders, and the 
stakeholder view, that there is intrinsic value in developing key stakeholder relations, this 
paper addresses two issues.  First, we analyze how the stock market, and thereby 
investors, react to corporations being classified as socially responsible.  Using the 
announcement date of firm inclusion in the FTSE4Good index we apply an event study 
methodology to capture the stock market response to this new information about the firm.  
If investors believe that the new information contained in this announcement signals a 
decrease in firm profitability (i.e. the Friedman view of CSR), then we would expect to 
see a significant and negative market reaction on announcement.  However, if the stock 
market views a firm being classified as socially responsible as value enhancing (i.e. the 
stakeholder view of CSR), then we would expect the market reaction to be significant and 
positive. 
The second stage of our analysis examines the firm specific characteristics that determine 
the market reaction to the announcement that a firm has been included in the FTSE4Good 
index.  There are a number of different firm characteristics that have been found to be 
important in analyzing CSR.  Prior studies have suggested for example factors such as 
firm size, turnover, market share, ownership, leverage, and profitability are important in 
explaining the social activities of firms (see for example, Lepoutre and Heene, 2006; and 
Adams and Hardwick, 1998).  As a result we use a number of these firm characteristics to 
test the determinants of the market reaction to firm inclusion in the FTSE4Good index.  
In particular we focus on variables that are important for measuring stakeholder 
relationships and corporate social activity namely, firm size (Roberts, 1992), leverage 
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(Adams and Hardwick, 1998), profitability (Alexander and Buchholz, 1978) and 
employee productivity (Berman, Wicks, Kotha and Jones, 1999).   
In addition to these well established variables we also consider an emerging and 
potentially important strand of the CSR literature, namely the corporate communication 
of the CSR activities of the firm (Arvidsson, 2010).  As a result of the complexities of 
defining CSR (Freeman et al, 2010), and thus understanding what it is that the market is 
reacting to, we also analyze the visibility of the firm (Meznar and Nigh, 1995) to analyze 
and control for the level of corporate communication that the firm engages in. 
The remainder of this article is set out as follows.  In Section 2 we discuss the 
FTSE4Good Index and the criteria for inclusion.  In Section 3 we discuss relevant 
literature and develop our hypotheses.  Section 4 presents our data and methodology 
while Section 5 discusses our results, Section 6 critically reflects on the different 
relationships that we find. Section 7 concludes and considers areas for future research. 
 
2. THE FTSE4GOOD INDEX 
FTSE4Good was launched in July 2001.  The establishment of the index had three main 
goals.  First, to allow investors to identify companies which are socially responsible 
based on a range of objective and independent CSR benchmarks.  Second, to create a 
performance benchmark that could be applied by socially responsible investment funds.  
Last, the promotion of greater corporate responsibility amongst firms
5
. 
The inclusion of a firm in the index is based on a wide range of criteria.  The first 




.  A negative screen is then applied to exclude a number of industries.  
Companies involved in tobacco, weapons systems and/or nuclear weapons systems either 
directly (whole systems) or indirectly (components), and nuclear power are excluded.  
For companies involved in uranium mining an industry specific screen is applied from 
2006.  It is therefore possible for a uranium mining firm to be included subject to 
stringent industry specific criteria from 2006 onwards. 
If a firm is not screened out based on its industry then inclusion in the index is dependent 
on meeting a number of eligibility criteria.  These criteria are split into five distinct areas, 
namely; working towards environmental sustainability; developing positive relationships 
with stakeholders; up-holding and supporting universal human rights; ensuring good 
supply chain labor standards; and countering bribery.  The inclusion criteria have 
however evolved through time and so the criteria on environmental sustainability and 
upholding universal human rights were strengthened in 2002 and 2003 respectively while 
supply chain labor standards were introduced in 2004/5 and countering bribery standards 
were introduced in 2005/6. 
The FTSE4Good policy committee collects the relevant information for the five 
eligibility criteria from a number of different sources including; scrutiny of annual 
reports; research of corporate websites; questionnaires; and meetings with corporate 
managers.  To assess if a firm meets the relevant criteria within each category the policy 
committee works in conjunction with a number of international partners including, the 
Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS; UK), Centre for Australian Ethical 
Research (CAER; Australia), EthiFinance (France), Avanzi (Italy), Stock-at-Stake 
(Belgium), Institut fur Markt-Umwelt-Gesellschaft (IMUG; Germany) and Fundacion 
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Ecoligia y Desarrollo (FED; Spain).  Through this network the research that is required 
for assessing a firm’s suitability for inclusion is collated on a semi-annual basis and 
measured against the inclusion criteria.  This then feeds into the semi-annual review of 
constituents (March and September) by the FTSE4Good policy committee. 
For the purpose of the present study, the question arises if the announcement of a firm’s 
inclusion in the FTSE4Good index will provide new information to the market (and may, 
therefore, generate a market reaction) or if, alternatively, information about a firm’s CSR 
activities is already incorporated into stock prices.  There are good reasons to believe that 
the announcement of a firm’s inclusion in the FTSE4Good index provides new 
information to the market.  First, the inclusion of a firm is decided objectively based on a 
wide range of externally set criteria.  Consequently, the benchmarking of the level and 
quality of CSR within a firm is likely to be accurate as it is determined by independent 
experts such as EIRIS.  Second, the information used to decide on a firm’s inclusion is 
collated from a wide range of sources.  Crucially, this includes a survey of the firms that 
are being considered and a process of consultation with the firm’s management.  This 
allows managers to convey private information about the CSR activities of the firm that 
can then be externally validated and quantified by an independent body (i.e. the 
FTSE4Good policy committee).  We therefore posit that inclusion in the FTSE4Good 
index will convey additional information to the market about the CSR activities of a firm 
which allows for an analysis of how the market perceives the value of CSR. 
 
3. RELEVANT LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
If inclusion in the FTSE4Good index conveys new information about a firm to market 
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investors, then this event can be viewed as either value enhancing or value destroying.  
We therefore put forward two competing hypotheses for the reaction of the stock market 
to a firm being included in FTSE4Good.  If shareholders follow the Friedman (1970) 
view of CSR, then it is simply an additional cost on the owners of the firm and a form of 
managerial excess.  As a result, the firm will be at a competitive disadvantage relative to 
its corporate peers as the firm has a higher cost base with no concomitant increase in 
corporate value (Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield, 1985).  CSR in this case is therefore a 
value destroying exercise and is contrary to the investor objective of increasing 
shareholder wealth. 
H1a: The stock market has a significant negative reaction to inclusion in FTSE4Good. 
Conversely, CSR may be perceived by the market as value enhancing in a way that is 
consistent with the Freeman (1984) stakeholder view of the corporation.  From the 
perspective of a shareholder, if various stakeholder relationships are managed within the 
overarching strategy of the firm, this could enhance the overall value of the corporation.  
CSR may therefore be a source of competitive advantage if it is implemented in a way 
that is consistent with the underlying business goals and governance strategy of the firm 
(Maxfield, 2008).  
One instance where this can be highlighted is if a firm has an effective anti-corruption 
policy this can lower the risk of costly law suits and fines.  For example, where a 
corporation is found to have engaged in bribery the fines imposed on the firm can be 
substantial.  In February 2010 BAE Systems, a UK arms manufacturer, was fined 
approximately £286m by the US Department of Justice in an out of court settlement over 
bribery charges against the firm.  The company was accused of having,  
 8 
“…made hundreds of millions of dollars in payments to third parties, while 
knowing of a high probability that money would be passed on to foreign government 
decision-makers to favor BAE in the award of defense contracts.”
7
  
Consequently, the market may react positively to the inclusion of a firm in FTSE4Good 
as this signals to the market that the expected future cash flows of the firm are lower risk 
and more certain, as costly law suits and fines are less likely to occur. 
H1b: The stock market has a significant positive reaction to inclusion in FTSE4Good. 
Additional firm characteristics are also important to understand the observed market 
reaction to inclusion in FTSE4Good.  Firm size is an important characteristic in analyzing 
corporate social responsibility.  Although, size does not proxy for any stakeholder 
relationship it captures a number of characteristics that may be important in explaining 
any observed market reaction.  One facet of whether CSR is value enhancing is the notion 
of ‘ability-to-pay’.  Where firms have lower amounts of financial resource, the cost of 
CSR is likely to reduce the ability of the firm to finance its ongoing operations and 
undertake new investment opportunities.  Consequently, CSR may reduce shareholder 
value in such circumstances.  Firm size arguably captures this ability to pay as company 
size is related to both economies of scale and competitive advantage (Ball and Foster, 
1982).  Roberts (1992) meanwhile argues that firm size creates increased political 
exposure and public scrutiny, and so larger firms undertake greater amounts of corporate 
social activity.  Moreover, increased levels of corporate social activity are also likely to 
occur where firms have a larger number of stakeholders who monitor the activities of the 
firm (Cowen et al, 1987).  Larger firms may therefore undertake more corporate social 
activity as this limits the risk that government or regulators impose additional costs on 
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their operations through taxes and compliance costs if they do not act in a socially 
responsible manner (Adams and Hardwick, 1998).  Consequently, undertaking CSR 
activities lowers the risk of future cash flows for large firms and so from the perspective 
of the investor the firm is more valuable as it offers a better risk/return payoff.  
H2: Firm size is positively related to the stock market reaction to inclusion in 
FTSE4Good 
Leverage is another important variable in analyzing the value of corporate social 
responsibility.  Debt holders are clearly an important stakeholder group within a firm.  
Debt holders provide part of a company’s finance and so the actions of managers will 
have a direct impact on this investor group.  Moreover, the use of leverage in the capital 
structure of the firm imposes constraints on managerial perquisite consumption as they 
are bound to service the cost of the debt (Jensen, 1986).  Leverage therefore forces 
managers to increase the value of the corporation as opposed to maximizing their 
personal wealth, as they are subject to increased scrutiny from the capital market 
(Easterbrook, 1984).   
However, as leverage increases beyond an optimal level this imposes increased 
contracting costs on the firm as it is subject to additional monitoring from debt holders.  
In such circumstances managers will have to set out the pre-emptive rights of claimants 
in the event of bankruptcy, and the firm may be subject to more stringent liquidity tests 
and unscheduled audits (Booth, 1992).  Consequently, as the firm moves closer to 
insolvency the needs of debt holders dominate the objectives of the firm to the detriment 
of all other stakeholders (Adams and Hardwick, 1998). 
H3: Firm leverage is negatively related to the stock market reaction to inclusion in 
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FTSE4Good 
The link between profitability and corporate social responsibility has also been widely 
investigated.  In looking at firm profitability Roberts (1992) sums up the link between 
firm profitability and CSR as a function of the economic performance of the firm.  As 
such, the capacity of the firm’s management to undertake socially responsible activities is 
likely to be subordinate to the survival of the firm as an economic entity.  However, as 
Roberts (1992) states, “…given certain levels of stakeholder power and strategic posture, 
the better the economic performance of a company, the greater its social responsibility 
activity and disclosures.” 
This link has also been argued by a wide number of authors [see for example Ullmann 
(1985), McGuire et al. (1988) and Adams and Hardwick (1998)].  Moreover, Alexander 
and Buchholz (1978) suggest that firms who undertake socially responsible investments 
are better run relative to firms that do not undertake such investments.  Socially 
responsible firms therefore signal increased managerial ability and financial performance 
(Alexander and Buchholz, 1978). 
H4: Firm profitability is positively related to the stock market reaction of inclusion in 
FTSE4Good 
Employees are a key stakeholder group within the firm and there is an extensive literature 
that shows investment and management of this stakeholder group adds value to the firm 
(see for example, Huselid, 1995; Delery and Doty, 1996 and Berman, Wicks, Kotha and 
Jones, 1998).  By managing employees as a key stakeholder group and investing in the 
workforce of the firm, this can lead to lower employee turnover and lower absenteeism, 
and create higher levels of productivity (Berman et al, 1998).  Investment in the 
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workforce of the firm has long been shown to be a source of competitive advantage 
(Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994; Becker and Gerhart, 1996).  Moreover, the inclusion 
criteria for FTSE4Good firms also place large emphasis on engagement with this 
stakeholder group, in a number of different ways including, equal opportunities, health 
and safety, staff training, education and employee relations.  If a firm is included in 
FTSE4Good it therefore indicates that this stakeholder group is well managed and may 
therefore signal a higher level of employee productivity. 
H5: Labor productivity is positively related to the stock market reaction to inclusion in 
FTSE4Good 
The emphasis that firms place on communicating the CSR activities and ethical activities 
that they undertake has increased considerably over the past decade (Arvidsson, 2010).  
Corporate communications managers therefore devote increasing amounts of corporate 
resources to communicate the CSR activities of the firm to investors.  Moreover, Meznar 
and Nigh (1995) argue that more visible firms are under pressure to engage in public 
relations and to manage the public perception of their activities. As a result, more visible 
firms are likely to have built up more corporate communication expertise prior to the 
announcement of inclusion in FTSE4Good.      
Although the announcement event we analyze in this study is not directly influenced by 
corporate communication expertise
8
, the ability of the firm to undertake effective 
corporate communication strategies may still influence the market reaction to inclusion in 
FTSE4Good.  Firms which are more visible come under greater scrutiny and pressure to 
demonstrate that they act in ways that conform to social norms (Roberts, 1992; Mezner 
and Nigh, 1995; Arvidsson, 2010).  As a result, high visibility firms are likely to have 
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greater corporate communications expertise as they do more to communicate the 
activities of the firm as this legitimizes the activities of the corporation (Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006).  However, there is a balance that needs to be struck in promoting the 
activities of the firm so that it becomes a meaningful communication of what the firm is 
doing rather than an exercise of self promotion (Borglund, 2009).  As such, the 
announcement of inclusion in the FTSE4Good index may help to mitigate any skepticism 
about the communication strategy of the firm as it legitimizes the position of the firm 
through independent confirmation of the firm’s own communication about its activities.  
H6: Firm visibility is positively related to the stock market reaction to inclusion in 
FTSE4Good. 
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Our sample consists of announcements that firms traded on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) are included in the FTSE4Good index over the period July 2001 to March 2008.  
We use Regulatory News Service (RNS) announcements of inclusion to identify the 
inclusion events we use.  RNS announcements for FTSE4Good inclusions are brief, 
factual and highly standardized in terms of their content
9
. The standardized nature by 
which inclusion is communicated is advantageous for our study as it prevents our results 
from being driven by factors such as the choice of communication channel or the tone 
and contents of the communication.  
In order to be sampled, firms must have financial information available on the 
Datastream-Worldscope database.  This leaves us with a sample of 356 index inclusions.  
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Following McWilliams and Siegel (1997) we then check our sample of 356 inclusions for 
confounding events such as dividend announcements, mergers and so on around our 
event window.  After investigating this we find that there are no confounding events and 
so our final sample consists of 356 inclusion events
10
. 
Table 1 provides an overview of our sample.  Announcement dates are concentrated in a 
small number of days.  The majority of the index additions (241) take place at the launch 
of the FTSE4Good on July 10
th
 2001.  The remaining 115 additions occur biannually in 
March and September for the remaining years of the sample following periodic index 
reviews by the FTSE4Good policy committee.  Although no particular period after the 
launch of the index is characterized by a high number of additions, the clustering of event 
dates over the sample period is taken into account in the empirical methods employed. 
In looking at the final column of Table 1 it is apparent that the original constituents of the 
FTSE4Good that were included in July 2001 have, on average, a much higher market 
capitalization than subsequent additions
11
.  This is consistent with expectations however, 
as larger firms are more likely to undertake CSR activities (Roberts, 1992; Cowen et al, 
1987; and Adams and Hardwick, 1998).  As such the initial constituents of the 
FTSE4Good index are expected to be larger firms relative to firms included in subsequent 
years. 
Event Study Estimation  
We employ an event study methodology to estimate the stock market reaction to firm 
inclusion in the FTSE4Good index.  First we estimate a market model of daily returns on 
FTSE market returns (Brown and Warner, 1985; McKinley, 1997).  Daily stock returns 
 14 
data are collected from Datastream.  Abnormal returns ( ) are calculated over our event 
windows around the FTSE4Good inclusion announcement (t=0).  For every firm added to 
the FTSE4Good we estimate the following regression, 
    (1) 
where Rit refers to the daily stock return for firm i to be included in the FTSE4Good.  
Given the clustered nature of the inclusion dates in March and September, we 
consecutively employ the FTSE100, FTSE350 and FTSE-All Share index for market 
returns (Rmt ) to ensure that our results are not driven by a particular equity benchmark 
for returns to our sample firms. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARi) are averaged over different event windows [(t-1, 
t+1), (t-2, t+2), (t-5, t+5), (t-10, t+1), (t-20, t+1)].  We follow Dodd and Warner (1983) 
and standardize abnormal returns (AR) on the event day E by the square root of their 
estimation period return variance ( ), 
   (2) 
where L the number of days (200) used in the market model and R and  are the equity 
returns and the market model return predictions, respectively. The concentration of events 
on a small number of days (event clustering) invalidates the assumption that abnormal 
returns are independently distributed across firms.  We therefore use the abnormal return 
statistics reported in Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) which are unaffected by 
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event clustering and which also correct for increases in the variance of abnormal returns 
around index additions. 
  (3) 
This yields the following t-statistic: 
          (4) 
To ensure that our results are robust to the effects of outliers, we use a Wilcoxon signed 
rank test. The resulting z-statistic indicates if median abnormal returns are statistically 
different from zero (See DeLong, 2001).  
 
5. RESULTS 
In this section, we explicitly test the hypotheses developed in Section 3 of the paper.  Our 
empirical results are split into two main parts.  First, we examine the market reaction to 
the announcement that a firm has been included in the FTSE4Good index.  Second, we 
explain the cross-sectional variation in the market reaction to inclusion by analyzing firm 
characteristics that are consistent with stakeholder theory and the determinants of 
corporate social activity. 
Event Study Results  
Table 2 shows the market reaction to the announcement that a firm is to be included in 
the FTSE4Good index.  The results show there is a positive and statistically significant 
market reaction on the announcement day of firm inclusion in the FTSE4Good index.  
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Measured against the FTSE 100 index, firms that are to be included realize abnormal 
returns on t=0 of 0.587% (statistically significant below 1% according to the t-statistic 
and the z-statistic). However, similar to Curran and Moran (2007), the average CARs are 
not significant over longer event period windows
12
.  
For robustness, we also run a simple test to confirm that the announcement of inclusion 
constitutes an event that is noticed by market participants.  We test if there is a market-
adjusted increase in trading volume on the day of the announcement.  Our results show 
that the average trading volume of the firms that are included in the index significantly 
increases on the announcement date when compared against the market.  Investors are 
therefore reacting to the announcement of index inclusion. 
We can therefore reject hypothesis H1a that the stock market views being classified as 
socially responsible as a cost to shareholders. However, the results presented in Table 2 
do not lead us to accept our competing hypothesis H1b either that being classified as 
socially responsible is associated with increased shareholder value. Instead, we conclude 
at this point that while shareholders do not view being classified as socially responsible 
as value destroying, we do not find strong evidence that inclusion in FTSE4Good, on 
average, increases shareholder value.  
However, despite the average event period return being statistically insignificant, the 
cross-sectional variation in the returns to individual firms is large.  For example, 
Baltimore Technologies plc, Future Network plc, and Eurodis Electron plc each 
experience market-adjusted returns of approximately 13% on the announcement date. In 
the next section, we analyze some of the determinants of these differences and examine a 
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number of firm characteristics which have been found to be important in both stakeholder 
theory and in the determinants of a firm’s CSR activities. 
Firm Level Determinants 
In this section, we examine a number of firm characteristics that have been found to be 
important proxies for stakeholder relationships and corporate social activity.  Based on 
the hypotheses developed in Section 3 we examine the following firm characteristics.  To 
capture firm size we use the log transformation of total assets (TA).  Firm profitability is 
measured by the return on equity (ROE).  Leverage (LEVER) is defined as total debt 
scaled by total assets. Productivity (PDCT) is defined as earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) scaled by the number employees. In effect, this ratio measures the 
£-contribution of each employee to a firm’s profit. Finally, following Meznar and Nigh 
(1995) we include a measure of firm visibility (VISIBLE) based on the number of times a 
firm is mentioned in the press. We construct this variable using Factiva to track the 
number of times that our sampled firms were mentioned in the Financial Times (London 
edition) during the three years before their inclusion in FTSE4Good
13
.  
We also include a number of firm level control variables. First we control for past firm 
growth, measured by the three-year asset growth rate (GRWTH). In Addition to this we 
also control for the future growth opportunities of the firm by including the market-to-
book ratio (MTB).  This is estimated as the sum of the market value of equity and long-
term debt divided by total assets.   
Complete variable definitions and summary statistics are provided in Table 3 and 
correlations are provided in Table 4. 
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Univariate Tests 
Table 5 divides our sample into two portfolios based on the magnitude of firm specific 
5-day CARs
14
.  The first column contains firms that are in the lowest market reaction 
quintile, while the second portfolio is made up of firms in the highest market reaction 
quintile.  We report mean firm characteristics in each of the portfolios and test for 
differences between the two groups. 
The results in Table 5 show that firms located in the top quintile (i.e. the portfolio with 
the largest positive reaction to inclusion in FTSE4Good), are significantly larger, by total 
assets (TA), than those firms that are located in the bottom quintile.  This is consistent 
with our second hypothesis that as a result of political visibility (Roberts, 1992) their 
ability-to-pay (Ball and Foster, 1982) and higher levels of monitoring (Cowen et al, 1987) 
larger firms will experience a larger positive reaction to the announcement that the firm is 
socially responsible as inclusion signals that the firm is lower risk.   
Our next hypothesis concerns firm leverage.  In looking at debt levels (LEVER) we do 
not find any statistically significant difference between the level of leverage of those 
firms in the high market reaction quintile and low market reaction quintile.  As such we 
cannot confirm or reject our hypothesis that leverage will have a significant negative 
relationship with the market reaction to inclusion.   
Next we consider firm profitability measured by return on equity (ROE).  From Table 5 it 
can be seen that we find that those firms in the high CAR quintile have a significantly 
higher return on equity when compared to those firms in the low CAR quintile.  This is 
again consistent with our hypothesis that more profitable firms will experience a higher 
market reaction, as firms that are more profitable undertake more successful CSR 
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(Roberts, 1992; Ullman, 1985; McGuire et al, 1988; Adams and Harwick, 1998) and that 
CSR when incorporated into the overall strategy of the firm can be a source of 
competitive advantage (Maxfield, 2008). 
For our hypothesis on employee productivity (PDCT) we suggest that there will be a 
positive relation between the observed market reaction to inclusion in the FSTE4Good 
and employee productivity.  If employees are carefully managed and the firm invests in 
this stakeholder group this leads to lower absenteeism and staff turnover and increased 
productivity (Berman et al, 1998).  In looking at Table 5 we can see that those firms in 
the high market reaction quintile have a significantly higher level of employee 
productivity compared to the low market reaction quintile which is again consistent with 
our hypothesis.   
Our final hypothesis considers the level of corporate communication made by the firm 
(VISIBLE) whereby the market reaction to the announcement of inclusion will have a 
significant and positive relationship with firm visibility. From the results in Table 5, 
however, we are unable to accept this hypothesis. 
Regression Analysis 
We next estimate the cross-sectional determinants of the market reaction to firm inclusion 
in the FTSE4Good index.  To this end we undertake OLS regressions of the 5-day CAR 
against firm size (TA), profitability (ROE), leverage (LEV) and employee productivity 
(PDCT), VISIBILITY and a vector of control variables discussed above. 
In addition to this we also include a firm-specific measure of stock liquidity (LIQUID) 
following Amihud (2002). The market reaction may be partly impacted by the liquidity of 
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a stock for a number of reasons.  Liquid stocks (i.e. stocks that are traded more 
frequently) are subject to greater outside scrutiny including press coverage.  
Consequently, any information on inclusion may be disseminated more quickly to market 
participants. Conversely, less liquid stocks (i.e. stocks that are traded less frequently) may 
experience a greater price reaction on announcement relative to liquid stocks.  This could 
occur as the announcement of inclusion and the concomitant public attention generated 
by this event may result in much greater attention and demand for the firm’s stock that is 
unrelated to the announcement of inclusion. 
We also include inflation-adjusted yearly GDP growth as a control in our regressions 
(GDP)
15
.  This control is included as it can be argued that against the background of a 
rapidly growing economy, the relative costs involved of undertaking CSR activities are 
lower compared to a period when the economy is growing normally.  Finally we include 
a dummy variable for the original constituents of the FTSE4Good index (ORIGINAL) 
which equals one if the firm was included in the FTSE4Good on 10
th
 July 2001 and is 
zero otherwise.  This variable will therefore capture any differences in the market 
response depending on the timing of index inclusion. 
To account for the clustered distribution of index inclusion dates, our specifications 
employ Huber-White sandwich estimators which allow for the dependence of 
observations within clusters of addition dates.  In addition to this we also include fixed 
effects for industry and time series effects.  We use Global Industry Classifications 
(GICs) and year fixed effects to do this.  In controlling for both these factors we can 
ensure that any observed results are not driven by factors such as general market 
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sentiment i.e. bull markets and bear markets and we also ensure that any relationships we 




The results of our cross-sectional regressions are presented in Table 6.  Across all of our 
different model specifications our results are consistent and robust to different market 
model estimates for our event window cumulative abnormal returns as well as controls 
for liquidity and GDP growth. 
Our first hypothesis on the cross-sectional determinants of the market reaction was that 
the market reaction would be positively related to firm size.  From the results in Table 6, 
it can be seen that firm size is significantly and positively related to the market reaction to 
firm inclusion.  This is consistent with the view that CSR activities are priced as value 
increasing for shareholders in larger firms, and so the ability-to-pay for such projects 
increases shareholder wealth while also benefiting other stakeholders that the firm invests 
in. Moreover, larger firms undertake greater levels of CSR as a result of increased public 
scrutiny (Roberts, 1992).  In doing so, this limits the likelihood of costly government 
intervention, tax increases and increased regulatory compliance costs (Adams and 
Hardwick, 1998).  The market reaction is therefore consistent with investors viewing the 
future cash flows of the firm as less risky and more valuable as the risk-to-reward payoff 
is better. 
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The estimate for our measure of corporate leverage is significant and negative.  This is 
again consistent with expectations as firms with large amounts of leverage are resource 
constrained, and as Adams and Hardwick (1998) suggest, where leverage is high then 
debt holders as a stakeholder group dominate all other stakeholders.  The significant and 
negative relation we observe is representative of the view that as a firm tends to 
bankruptcy the firm’s resources are allocated away from other stakeholder groups 
towards debt holders.  The market therefore does not price the announcement of highly 
leveraged firms undertaking CSR activities as adding value.  This could occur for two 
reasons.  First, the long-term gains that are normally generated from CSR activities are 
unlikely to persist as the resources that are allocated to other stakeholder groups may be 
diverted to bond holders in the future.  Second, in the short-term, the investment in other 
stakeholder groups could put increased pressure on a firm trying to service its debts as the 
cash flow is being diverted away from interest payments. 
The relationship between firm profitability and the level of CSR activities a firm 
undertakes is well documented in extant literature.  However, from our regressions 
profitability, as measured by return on equity, despite having the correct sign, is 
statistically insignificant and so we cannot accept our hypothesis that firm level 
profitability is related to the market reaction to a firm’s inclusion in the FTSE4Good. 
From Table 6 it can be seen that higher levels of employee productivity are associated 
with a significant and positive market reaction.  We can therefore accept our final 
hypothesis that the stock market reaction to a firm being classified as socially responsible 
is associated with higher levels of employee productivity.  From the perspective of 
investors, if a firm is classified as socially responsible this signals to the market that the 
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firm invests in employees as a stakeholder group.  Consequently, this implies increased 
value as higher productivity in the workforce is one the many benefits of investing in 
employees as a stakeholder group.  For investors this may also indicate higher long-term 
profitability as there is likely to be lower absenteeism and staff turnover and so this is a 
potential source of competitive advantage (Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994; Becker and 
Gerhart, 1996; and Berman et al, 1998). 
The last relationship that we consider is the impact of firm visibility.  From Table 6 
visibility is insignificant across all of our regressions.  As a result we cannot accept our 
hypothesis for visibility.  Despite this the inclusion of firm visibility in our analysis 
moderates the impact of corporate communication on the relationships that we find are 
significant thereby increasing the robustness of these findings.   
 
6. DISCUSSION 
Although our analysis has confirmed a number of our hypotheses, the findings of our 
study need careful consideration.  The contribution of the study in trying to establish how 
the stock market reacts to firms being classified as socially responsible and what factors 
can explain any observed reaction can only be understood as a first step in understanding 
the value or otherwise that markets place on the CSR activities of firms.  There are a 
number of issues that need to be reflected on in interpreting our results given debates 
within the literature and the analysis that we have undertaken.    
The first issue that must be considered is the use of event study methodologies.  Event 
studies are useful for analyzing the stock market reaction to events that may contain new 
 24 
information about a firm.  However, underlying this method are a number of assumptions 
about market participants whereby they are rational economic operators and can fully 
process the information that they receive.  This may not always be the case.  As Freeman 
et al (2010) show, the definition of our event signal is subject to much debate within the 
literature as there are so many different viewpoints on what corporate social 
responsibility actually is (e.g. corporate social performance, corporate governance, 
corporate social enterprise, etc.).  Consequently, what informational content the market is 
actually reacting to is not necessarily an unconditional appreciation for the benefits of a 
firm being socially responsible.   
Therefore, to ensure that the observed reaction is actually responding to inclusion events 
in the way we hypothesize, future research should consider different geographical 
markets where such indexes are applied (e.g. the U.S.).  If similar results can be detected 
in these markets, then this adds additional robustness with regards to the relationships 
that have been examined in this study and the assertion that the market believes that there 
is value in firms that act in a socially responsible way.  
Further, we hypothesized that, firms with greater communication expertise experience a 
higher market reaction to inclusion in the FTSE4Good.  Despite the fact that our analysis 
is unable to confirm this hypothesis, we believe that analyzing how firms communicate 
their CSR activities to the market is an important and emerging stream of research in the 
CSR literature.   
Also, for those firms with little corporate communication experience, the announcement 
of FTSE4Good inclusion may raise the profile of the corporation and generate interest in 
the firm from investors that would have been previously unaware about the company and 
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its activities.  Consequently, understanding the effects of communications expertise on 
communicating CSR is a fruitful area for further research. 
Finally, the growth of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) and the increased demand 
for ethical investments may be a factor in any observed market reaction.  As Sparkes and 
Cowton (2004) note, the demand for SRI is no longer confined to the fringes of the fund 
management industry. Instead, it is a way of investing that has gained considerable 
momentum within the mainstream of the industry with large institutions such as pension 
funds now placing ethical/responsible investment within their overarching investment 
strategy.  As such, given the increased number and size of investors who engage in 
ethical investing, any reaction that is observed in our study may partly be driven by firms 
attracting a new investor clientele.  Inclusion in FTSE4Good may therefore create 
demand from the type of ‘ethical investor’ identified by Belkaoui (1976) who would 
previously not have considered investing. 
Future research should investigate how important corporate social responsibility is to 
mainstream fund managers. One possibility would be to use a more qualitative type of 
analysis. For instance, it would be of value to survey fund managers about whether they 
trade in response to CSR-related information. Doing so this would allow for a deeper 
understanding of the exact type of information the market is reacting to in the context of 




This paper investigates whether corporate social responsibility is viewed by investors as a 
value destroying or value creating action by corporate managers.  Friedman (1970) put 
forward the view that firms undertaking social investments and activities was not in 
society’s interest as firms need only generate profits.  However, there are a number of 
reasons to believe that by managing stakeholder relationships value can be added to the 
firm above the cost of undertaking such actions.  From a market participant’s perspective 
this value can come from a two sources.  One potential source is increased cash flow, for 
example through higher worker productivity as a result of investing in the workforce of 
the firm.  The other potential source is through less risky future cash flows, whereby CSR 
activities can lower the likelihood of costly law suits or increased regulatory intervention 
and compliance costs. 
Our findings add to the existing body of literature that analyzes the financial performance 
of socially responsible firms.  Crucially our study considers the market reaction to a firm 
being independently classified as socially responsible by the stock exchange where the 
firm is traded.   
Our results indicate no strong evidence that the announcement of inclusion in the 
FTSE4Good index creates value.  However, there is a large cross-sectional variation in 
the market reaction with some firms experiencing large positive event day returns and so 
the market clearly responds to the CSR inclusion event in different ways.   
We then explain the observed market reaction in the context of stakeholder theory and 
firm level determinants of corporate social activity.  The findings of our cross-sectional 
analysis show that firms that experience a positive market reaction are larger, with lower 
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leverage and have a higher level of employee productivity. We also considered the 
corporate communications expertise of the firm, although this relationship was found to 
be insignificant. 
Our results show that the market clearly responds to the CSR inclusion event and that this 
can be explained by using a number of well established measures of stakeholder 
relationships.  However, this does allow us to conclude that the market reaction is a result 
of market participants equating CSR to increased corporate value.  In investigating the 
market reaction a number of other potential explanations emerged and these merit 
investigation in the future.  In particular, future research should use qualitative data, for 
instance by conducting a survey of market participants to understand whether or not the 
market reaction we report is a result of investor clientele effects or whether it is actually 





 Milton Friedman, New York Times Magazine, 1970. 
2
 See Margolis and Walsh, 2003 for a comprehensive review of the literature on the 
market based and accounting based performance of socially responsible firms. 
3
 While Curran and Moran (2007) have also analysed the stock market reaction to 
inclusion in FTSE4Good, our analysis is much more extensive, because it considers a 
substantially larger number of events and because we also analyse the determinants of the 
market reaction. Curran and Moran report the market reaction to a sample of 50 
inclusions. 
4
 Recent work has also considered whether the CSR activity of corporations is reflected 
in corporate bond yields (Menz, 2010) 
5
 The following section is a summary of the inclusion criteria of the FTSE4Good index.  
Source: www.ftse.com  
6
 The FTSE Developed Index is a global index and is used for international FTSE4Good 
indexes.  Our analysis only considers the UK FTSE4Good index as this is the longest 
lived index.  
7
 Source: BAE Systems handed £286m criminal fines in UK and US, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk, 5
th
 February, 2010.   
8
 A full explanation of the content and nature of Regulatory News Service disclosures and 
the rational for these disclosures being unaffected by the corporate communication 




 For instance, a typical RNS announcement simply states that “FTSE advises that 
COMPANIES X Y Z are to be included in the FTSE4Good UK index. The change is 
effective after close of business on dd/mm/year.” 
10
 An obvious extension to this analysis is to examine deletions from the FTSE4Good 
index.  However, very few firms are deleted over our sample period and so it is not 
possible to undertake meaningful statistical analysis of the firm characteristics and the 
market reaction to deletion. 
11
 This is also the case for the average value of total asset with the exception being in 
March 2007.  However this was caused by the addition of Standard Life a large insurer 
(with total assets worth £130 billion) which skewed the average value of the total assets. 
12
 The results for all of the univariate tests are robust to employing different FTSE equity 
benchmarks. 
13
 Meznar and Nigh (1995) use this measure for US firms as a proxy for communications 
expertise arguing that more visible firms are under pressure to engage in public relations 
and to manage the public perception of their activities 
14
 Conducting this analysis with any of the other event windows under examination does 
not alter the results. 
15
 This variable is collected from the Office of National Statistics, www.ons.gov.uk.   
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 Table 1 Sample Overview: FTSE4Good Additions 







      
10 July 2001 241 67.51  11,100 5,442 
17 September 2002 14 3.92  3,879 3,196 
19 March 2003 7 1.96  1,039 476 
17 September 2003 15 4.2  795 504 
12 March 2004 11 3.08  1,123 632 
10 September 2004 12 3.36  1,132 698 
10 March 2005 4 1.12  389 267 
07 September 2005 12 3.36  510 667 
08 March 2006 9 2.52  1,371 1,437 
13 September 2006 3 0.84  528 715 
07 March 2007 8 2.24  18,100 1,860 
12 September 2007 16 4.48  1,604 2,550 
13 March 2008 4 1.12  4,621 4,006 
      
Total 356 100  8,379 4,153 
      
Source: Regulatory News Service (RNS) 
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Table 2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) linked to FTSE4Good Inclusion 
Table 2 shows % cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) averaged over event windows surrounding the announcement that UK firms are to be included in the FTSE4Good index.  CARs are 
calculated using a market model against different UK equity indices (FTSE100, FTSE350, FTSE All Share).  t-Stats of statistical differences are based on standardized abnormal returns as in 
Boehmer et al (2001).  z-Stats are based on a Wilcoxon sign rank test. Next to the full sample, CAR are also reported for the subsamples of initial constituents (announced on 10 July 2001) and 
subsequent constituents.  
 
 Full Sample  Initial Constituents  Later Constituents 
 N CAR (%) t-stat z-stat   N CAR (%) t-stat z-stat   N CAR (%) t-stat z-stat  
Market Index: FTSE 100 
0 356 0.587 (4.43)*** (2.49)**  241 0.688 (4.00)*** (2.31)**  115 0.375 (1.92)** (2.04)** 
(t-1; t+1) 356 0.017 (0.21) (0.96)  241 0.066 (0.69) (0.36) 
 115 -0.085 (-0.62) (-0.17) 
(t-2, t+2) 356 -0.129 (-0.91) (-2.72)  241 -0.112 (-0.32) (-0.26) 
 115 -0.167 (-0.48) (-0.56) 
(t-5, t+5) 356 -0.272 (-0.76) (-5.91)  241 -0.271 (-0.56) (-0.91) 
 115 -0.275 (-0.58) (-0.32) 
(t-10, t+1) 356 -0.267 (-0.60) (-5.81)  241 -0.341 (-0.83) (-0.85) 
 115 -0.113 (-0.83) (-0.52) 
(t-20, t+1) 356 -0.211 (-0.51) (-6.23)  241 -0.317 (-0.63) (-0.73)  115 0.013 (0.38) (0.92) 
Market Index: FTSE 350 
0 356 0.561 (4.25)*** (2.24)**  241 0.656 (3.83)*** (2.01)**  115 0.361 (1.96)** (1.96)** 
(t-1; t+1) 356 0.018 (0.23) (0.91)  241 0.064 (0.67) (0.36) 
 115 -0.078 (-0.57) (-1.06) 
(t-2, t+2) 356 -0.123 (0.82) (0.62)  241 -0.108 (-0.28) (-0.21) 
 115 -0.153 (-0.38) (0.46) 
(t-5, t+5) 356 -0.261 (0.54) (0.71)  241 -0.259 (0.36) (0.71) 
 115 -0.264 (-0.49) (-0.25) 
(t-10, t+1) 356 -0.256 (0.80) (0.59)  241 -0.326 (0.62) (0.60) 
 115 -0.110 (-0.79) (-0.49) 
(t-20, t+1) 356 -0.196 (0.13) (0.87)  241 -0.296 (0.20) (0.34)  115 0.015 (0.43) (0.92) 
Market Index: FTSE All Share 
0 356 0.557 (4.23)*** (2.19)**  241 0.651 (3.80)*** (1.96)**  115 0.361 (1.96)** (1.98)** 
(t-1; t+1) 356 0.024 (0.30) (0.81)  241 0.072 (0.76) (0.26) 
 115 -0.077 (-0.57) (-0.04) 
(t-2, t+2) 356 -0.116 (-0.73) (-0.50)  241 -0.100 (-0.19) (-0.09) 
 115 -0.150 (-0.35) (-0.43) 
(t-5, t+5) 356 -0.254 (-0.42) (-0.58)  241 -0.252 (-0.24) (-0.58) 
 115 -0.260 (-0.46) (-0.21) 
(t-10, t+1) 356 -0.248 (-0.64) (-0.40)  241 -0.315 (-0.45) (-0.40) 
 115 -0.109 (-0.79) (-0.48) 
(t-20, t+1) 356 -0.188 (-0.93) (-0.68)  241 -0.285 (-0.98) (-0.12)  115 0.015 (0.43) (0.92) 
*** statistical significance at 1%, ** significant at 5% 
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Table 3 Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Unless otherwise specified, the data refer to the last reporting date before the inclusion in FTSE4Good.  Accounting 
data are from Worldscope, LIQUID is calculated with data from Datastream, and GDP data are from the Office of 
National Statistics 
Variable Definition N Mean SD Min Max 
       
TA Natural logarithm of total assets. 356 13.293 2.007 8.062 19.927 
LEVER Total debt divided by total assets. 356 0.221 0.175 0.000 0.914 
ROE Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
divided by the book value of common 
equity. 
356 0.305 1.666 -3.413 29.813 
PDCT EBIT divided by number of employees 356 37.409 85.900 -62.382 336.629 
VISIBLE Firm visibility in financial press. Total 
number of times that firm is mentioned 
in the Financial Times (London edition) 
during the three fiscal years before index 
inclusion. We add one to the measure 
and take the natural log. 
356 2.812 1.668 0.000 6.964 
LIQUID Liquidity measure. Average daily ratio 
of absolute stock return to trading 
volume, measured over the calendar year 
before the addition date. We add one to 
the measure and take the natural log.  
356 0.001 0.001 -0.008 0.001 
SALES Sales divided by total assets. 356 0.959 0.910 0.010 8.870 
CF Cash flows divided by total assets. 356 0.100 0.162 -0.432 0.362 
GRWTH (%) Growth in total assets over the three 
years before FTSE4Good inclusion. 356 2.241 12.133 -0.675 149.441 
EMPL Number of employees divided by total 
assets. 356 0.011 0.017 0.000 0.201 
MTB (Market value of equity plus long-term 
debt) divided by total assets. 356 2.199 3.792 0.155 29.441 
GDP Inflation-adjusted GDP growth in the 
year of the index inclusions. 356 0.081 0.326 -1.061 0.696 




Table 4 Pairwise Correlations of Firm Characteristics 
The table presents pairwise correlations between variables. CARs are standardized abnormal returns using the market model over five-days surrounding the inclusion in FTSE4Good measured 
against the FTSE All Share index.  SeeTable 3 for variables definitions. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) CARs              
(2) TA .08             
(3) ROE .01 .05            
(4) SALES -.04 -.25
***
 .09           
(5) CF -.03 .17 .06 .09          
(6) LEVER -.03 .31
***
 .14 -.09 .10         
(7) GRWTH .11 -.03 .01 -.06 .00 .13        
(8) EMPL -.04 -.25 .03 .46
**
 .02 -.14 -.03       
(9) PDCT .05 .16 .01 -.19 .07 .20
**
 -.01 -.14      
(10) MTB .01 -.31
***
 -.07 -.03 -.11 -.18
*
 .00 .01 -.08     
(11) VISIBLE .01 .41
**
 .05 -.08 -.02 .12 .07 -.02 -.10 -.11    
(12) LIQUID .00 .18 .01 -.10 .00 .07 .00 -.01 .06 -.02 .08   
(13) GDP .09 -.05 .02 -.12 -.03 -.06 .02 .03 -.02 .05 -.01 -.05  
(14) ORIGINAL .00 .06 .04 -.11 -.03 .02 .05 .09 .01 .12 -.01 -.09 .39
**
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5 FTS4Good Firm Characteristics, by CAR (t-2, t+2) 
The table presents firm characteristics by five-day cumulative announcement returns (CAR) surrounding the 
announcement that UK firms are to be included in FTSE4Good.  CARs are based on standardized market model 
abnormal returns computed against the FTSE 100, FTSE350 and FTSE All Share index.  Firm characteristics are 
presented by lowest (LOW) and top (HIGH) CAR quintile.  Differences in means tests are based on a two-tailed t-








QUINTILE    
 N CAR (%)  N CAR (%)  
Difference 
HIGH-LOW t-stat 
Market Index: FTSE 100 
         
TA 72 12.449  71 13.155  0.706 (2.31)**
,†
 
LEVER 72 0.194  71 0.195  0.002 (0.05) 
ROE 72 0.044  71 0.160  0.116 (1.39) 
PDCT 72 -9.369  71 56.754  66.123 (2.44)**
 ,†
 
VISIBLE 72 2.526  71 2.691  0.165 (0.61) 
         
Market Index: FTSE 350 
         
TA 72 12.442  71 13.121  0.679 (2.23)**
 ,†
 
LEVER 72 0.188  71 0.194  0.006 (0.20) 
ROE 72 0.051  71 0.163  0.112 (1.34) 
PDCT 72 -9.229  71 57.119  66.348 (2.45)**
 ,†
 
VISIBLE 72 2.512  71 2.650  0.137 (0.50) 
         
Market Index: FTSE All Share 
         
TA 72 12.442  71 13.155  0.713 (2.31)**
 ,†
 
LEVER 72 0.188  71 0.193  0.005 (0.17) 
ROE 72 0.051  71 0.165  0.114 (1.36) 
PDCT 72 -9.229  71 56.949  66.178 (2.44)**
 ,†
 
VISIBLE 72 2.512  71 2.676  0.164 (0.88) 
         
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, (t-test)
 




Table 6 Regressions: CAR (t-2; t+2)  
The table presents regressions on five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) surrounding the announcement that 
UK firms are to be included in FTSE4Good. Regressions include fixed effects for the industry (Global Industry 
Classifications) and the year of index inclusion.  CARs are calculated using a market model against different UK 
equity indices (FTSE 100, FTSE 350, and FTSE All Share).  Variable definitions are in Table 3.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses and are based on the cluster-robust variant of the Huber-White sandwich estimator which 
accounts for the dependence of observations within clusters of addition dates. 
 FTSE 100 FTSE 350 FTSE-All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
TA 0.1159*** 0.1159*** 0.1166*** 0.1166*** 0.1181*** 0.1181*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0359) 
LEVER -0.8119* -0.8119* -0.8091* -0.8091* -0.8156* -0.8156* 
 (0.4156) (0.4156) (0.4146) (0.4146) (0.4137) (0.4137) 
ROE 0.0178 0.0178 0.0177 0.0177 0.0173 0.0173 
 (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0174) 
PDCT 0.0022** 0.0021** 0.0021** 0.0022** 0.0020** 0.0021** 
 (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0010) 
VISIBLE -0.0277 -0.0277 -0.0274 -0.0274 -0.0280 -0.0280 
 (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0230) 
LIQUID -51.8054 -51.8054 -51.5113 -51.5113 -50.6956 -50.6956 
 (29.2497) (29.2497) (28.8404) (29.8404) (28.9324) (29.9324) 
SALES 0.0610 0.0610 0.0607 0.0607 0.0606 0.0606 
 (0.0996) (0.0996) (0.0997) (0.0997) (0.0994) (0.0994) 
CF -0.0307* -0.0307* -0.0309** -0.0309** -0.0309** -0.0309** 
 (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) 
GRWTH 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
EMPL -0.3632 -0.3632 -0.3916 -0.3916 -0.4334 -0.4334 
 (1.6697) (1.6697) (1.6576) (1.6576) (1.6554) (1.6554) 
MTB 0.0101*** 0.0101*** 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0110*** 0.0110*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
ORIGINAL 0.0350 -0.1429 0.0060 -0.1556 0.0056 -0.1495 
 (0.1112) (0.5855) (0.0951) (0.5631) (0.0919) (0.5561) 
GDP  0.5347  0.5286  0.5237 
  (0.4581)  (0.4395)  (0.4337) 
       
CONSTANT -1.6238*** -1.5359*** -1.5993*** -1.5266*** -1.6081*** -1.5411*** 
 (0.4487) (0.4918) (0.4408) (0.4727) (0.4399) (0.4672) 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 356 356 356 356 356 356 
Adj. R-Sq 0.0702 0.0723 0.0703 0.0721 0.0706 0.0727 
       
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
